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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 900186-CA 
v. : 
M. ELDON BARNES, Warden, : 
Utah State Prison, Category No. 2 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a denial of a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
district court erred in denying the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. A denial of habeas corpus relief will be reviewed in the 
light most favorable to the judgment and will not be reversed 
unless there is no reasonable basis to support the denial. Bundy 
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitutional provisions for a 
determination of this case are referred to in the body of this 
brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Richard Lynn Wright, was charged with two 
counts of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-302 (1990),1 and two counts of 
aggravated kidnapping, first degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990). Petitioner moved to dismiss 
the charges on speedy trial grounds, which motion was denied on 
March 22, 1985, by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, Second 
Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah. On June 
14, 1985, a jury trial commenced before the Honorable David E. 
Roth, Judge, Second Judicial District Court. On June 17, 1985, 
the jury returned verdicts of guilty to both counts of aggravated 
robbery and not guilty as to aggravated kidnapping. Petitionee 
was sentenced to concurrent statutory indeterminate terms in the 
3 
Utah State Prison of five years to life. 
Petitioner directly appealed his convictions to the 
Utah Supreme Court. On June 9, 1987, the convictions were 
affirmed in State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987). A 
petition for rehearing was denied on November 30, 1987. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 was amended in 1989, subsequent to 
the trial in this case; but, the amendment is not applicable to 
the present facts. 
o 
The kidnapping statute was also amended to impose minimum 
mandatory sentences, however, these provisions are not applicable 
to a consideration of this case as defendant was acquitted of the 
kidnapping charges. 
3 
These procedural facts are from the original trial file, 
utilized by the court below and by the Utah Supreme Court in 
plaintiff's original direct appeal. That record has not been 
included on appeal but there is no dispute as to these procedural 
aspects. 
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On July 26, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the Utah Supreme Court (R. 2-5). The 
State responded by filing an answer and moving for summary 
disposition (R. 67, 85-86). On September 6, 1989, the petition 
was referred to the Third Judicial District Court (R. 87). 
Pro bono counsel was appointed for petitioner by the 
district court at petitioner's request (R. 105-106). 
Supplemental memorandum was filed by petitioner's counsel (R. 
107-116) . 
On January 10, 1990, a non-evidentiary hearing was held 
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, Third Judicial District 
Court, on the petition for writ of habeas corpus and respondent's 
motion for summary judgment. The court orally granted the motion 
for summary judgment and denied the petition for habeas corpus 
relief (R. 135). Written findings of fact, based on the facts 
established by the record, and conclusions of law were entered on 
January 29, 1990 (R. 137-146). 
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court on January 18, 1990 (R. 136). The matter was subsequently 
referred to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The underlying facts of this case, as previously 
determined by the Utah Supreme Court in affirming the 
convictions, are: 
On September 8, 1976, a man driving an 
orange Corvette owned by [petitioner] robbed 
two Weber County deputy sheriffs of their 
service revolvers. 
Late in September, 1976, Canadian police 
officers in British Columbia arrested 
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[petitioner]. He was driving an orange 
Corvette and had in his possession the 
service revolvers stolen from the Weber 
County deputies. [Petitioner] tried to shoot 
one of the arresting officers and refused to 
cooperate during booking. He refused to be 
fingerprinted and signed his booking document 
"John F. Kennedy." j[Petitioner] was forcibly 
fingerprinted, "kneed" in the stomach by the 
officer at whom he had shot, and placed in a 
holding cell. The next day, [petitioner] 
confessed to the Weber County robbery. 
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1987) (footnote 
omitted). (R. 138-139, paragraph 4). 
Prior to his trial, petitioner moved the court to 
dismiss the criminal charges, claiming that his right to a speedy 
trial had been denied. Petitioner asserted that an information 
had been filed against him in 1976 but that the State had failed 
to bring him to trial until 1985 (R. 139-140, paragraph 7). The 
trial court denied the motion (R. 140, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10). 
On appeal, the issue was again raised (R. 141, 
paragraph 14). The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[a]nother 
individual had been charged shortly after the crime, but those 
charges were dismissed at an early stage." Wright, 745 P.2d at 
449 n.l. (R. 139, paragraph 5.) After petitioner was arrested 
in Canada, he was convicted in Canada on unrelated charges and 
sentenced to serve twenty years imprisonment. Pursuant to a 
prisoner exchange program, petitioner was transferred to a United 
States federal prison in 1978. In 1979, he was transferred to 
California to face other charges and then returned to the federal 
prison. In July, 1979, petitioner was transferred to the Utah 
State Prison. Wright, 745 P.2d at 449. At no time, did 
petitioner request disposition of his Utah criminal charges 
-4-
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990). Wright, 745 P.2d at 
450-451. (R. 139, paragraph 6.) 
Based on these facts, the Utah Supreme Court concluded 
that no sixth amendment violation occurred as the right to a 
speedy trial attaches only upon the filing of an information. 
The Court did not agree with petitioner's claim that the 
information was filed in 1976, but concluded that the information 
was filed in 1985. Wright, 745 P.2d at 449. Further, the Court 
noted: 
An undue delay before charges are filed 
against a defendant may constitute a 
violation of the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment. . . . In this case, 
defendant makes no due process claim. We 
note that in order to constitute a due 
process violation, preaccusation delay must 
cause 'actual prejudice to the defendant's 
case and result in tactical advantage for the 
prosecutor.' . . . Defendant has not alleged, 
and the facts do not suggest, that the 
prosecution delayed the filing of charges 
against him in order to achieve a tactical 
advantage. 
Wright, 745 P.2d at 450 (citations and footnote omitted). 
The Supreme Court further found that petitioner's 
confession to the robberies was voluntary and therefore properly 
admissible. Wright, 745 P.2d at 451. 
At trial, petitioner was represented by appointed 
counsel, Bernard Allen, and was also allowed to appear pro se at 
times (R. 139, paragraph 7; R. 140, paragraph 9). On the initial 
appeal, Mr. Allen continued to represent petitioner (R. 141, 
paragraph 13). After the convictions were affirmed, petitioner 
was appointed new appellate counsel, Kevin Sullivan, for purposes 
of filing a petition for rehearing. The petition for rehearing 
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was filed August 28, 1987, and included within it a claim that 
Mr. Allen was ineffective in presenting the appeal (R. 143, 
paragraph 19). Petitioner also filed a pro se supplemental 
petition for rehearing claiming that both Messrs. Allen and 
Sullivan were ineffective (R. 143, paragraph 20). The petitions 
for rehearing were denied. 
Some two years later, petitioner filed the present 
petition for writ of habeas corpus (R. 2-5). Respondent moved 
for summary judgment on the grounds: 
1. Petitioner had failed to show any unusual 
circumstances or good cause for the 
relitigation of his claims in a successive 
postconviction hearing; 
2. Any claims of error raised by petitioner 
had either been previously adjudicated or 
were not supported by the record. 
(R. 85-86). The district court assigned counsel to petitioner, 
Mr. Mitchell J. Olsen (R. 105-106). Memoranda were submitted by 
the parties. The district court was supplied with the trial and 
direct appeal records, including all transcripts and briefs. A 
non-evidentiary hearing was held on January 10, 1990, before the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, Third Judicial District Court, to 
consider the arguments of counsel as to the appropriateness of 
granting the summary judgment motion and denying the petition. 
After full consideration of the record and memoranda, the court 
denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus (R. 135, 147-148). 
This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
All of petitioner's present claims, with the exception 
of ineffective counsel, were raised and adjudicated on direct 
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appeal from his convictions. As such, petitioner is estopped 
from relitigating the same matters. 
The only appropriate claim for consideration 
collaterally is petitioner's assertion of ineffective appellate 
counsel. However, the Utah Supreme Court, in the direct appeal, 
addressed the underlying claims of demonstrable error advocated 
now by petitioner and found no error. Additionally, even if it 
is assumed arguendo that petitioner's appellate counsel did 
commit error, petitioner has failed to establish any prejudice. 
Therefore, the ineffective counsel claim must fail. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THAT PETITIONER 
HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS DENIED 
THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Petitioner does not claim that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial. Rather, he asserts 
that his appellate counsel was ineffective (Br. of Appellant at 
3-5). Each of the points now raised on appeal were raised and 
fully considered by the district court in denying petitioner 
habeas corpus relief. Therefore, this Court must review the 
record in the light most favorable to the judgement and uphold 
the denial of collateral relief as long as there is a reasonable 
basis to support the denial. Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988). Further, it is petitioner's burden to marshal all 
the facts established from the record which support the denial, 
and then demonstrate than even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the judgement of the court, that the record is 
insufficient to support the court's determination of the facts. 
-7-
Shearf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Grayson 
Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinsonf 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989). 
It is well-establish€sd that the post-conviction writ of 
habeas corpus provided for in rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "is not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform 
the function of regular appellate review," Codianna v. Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983). Accord Bundy v. Deland, 763 P«2d 
at 804; Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987). Rather 
the function of post-conviction relief is: 
to provide a means for collaterally attacking 
convictions when they are so constitutionally 
flawed that they result in fundamental 
unfairness and to provide for collateral 
attack of sentences not authorized by law. 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989). 
Consequently, the relitigation of issues in successive 
post-conviction hearings is limited to unusual circumstances where 
it would be unconscionable not to reexamine the claim to assure 
that petitioner was afforded substantial justice. Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d at 1115 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
A ground for relief from a conviction or 
sentence that has once been fully and fairly 
adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas 
proceeding should not be readjudicated unless 
it can be shown that there are "unusual 
circumstances." For example, a prior 
adjudication is not a bar to reexamination of 
a conviction if there has been a retroactive 
change in the law, a subsequent discovery of 
suppressed evidence, or newly discovered 
evidence. 
Lairby v. Barnes, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah June 5, 1990) 
(quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d at 1036). 
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Here, the district court had before it the full record 
in this case. The court considered not only the conclusions of 
the Utah Supreme Court, but also independently reviewed the 
record. 
The facts in this case were not disputed. The only 
fact, which petitioner even attempted to claim below to be in 
dispute, was whether petitioner had been charged in 1976 such 
that the sixth amendment applied or whether he was charged in 
1985 such that the fifth amendment would have been applicable, 
i.e., whether there had been a speedy trial violation or a 
preaccusation delay. But, the factual issue of when petitioner 
was charged had previously been fully adjudicated on direct 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Wright, 745 P.2d at 449. (R. 
141-142, paragraphs 14 and 16) The district court therefore 
determined, based on the record facts, that petitioner was not 
charged until 1985 (R. 139, paragraphs 5 and 6). Having 
determined that petitioner had fully raised this issue before the 
Utah Supreme Court, which court had concluded that petitioner had 
not been denied either his fifth or sixth amendment right to be 
timely charged or tried, the district court properly concluded 
that petitioner had suffered no constitutional violation in this 
regard (R. 145, Conclusions of Law, paragraph 4). See Wright, 
745 P.2d at 449-450. 
The remainder of what petitioner claims on appeal were 
disputed facts are not. Instead, the "facts" are either matters 
previously fully argued and adjudicated by the Utah Supreme Court 
or are legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts, i.e., 
-9-
counsel was ineffective. The actual facts of petitioner's case, 
both procedurally and substantively, were not at issue below. 
Rather, petitioner's claim was simply that his counsel had 
ineffectively argued those facts on direct appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
does not in itself constitute an unusual circumstance or good 
cause justifying successive post-conviction litigation. 
To permit the inevitable instances of 
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify 
for the "unusual circumstances" exception 
would allow that exception to swallow up the 
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from 
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative 
appeal mechanism in contravention of the 
finality of criminal judgments that is the 
settled policy of this state. 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1105. Accord Dunn v. Cook, 131 
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10-11 (Utah April 2, 1990). However, the State 
recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has found exceptions to 
this rule. Ijd. , 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12; Fernandez v. Cook, 783 
P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). 
The standard for determining ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial requires the petitioner to establish: 
[F]irst, that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant. 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d at 805 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)). An 
ineffectiveness claim can only be supported by demonstrable errors 
of sufficient magnitude that "but for counsel's unprofessional 
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errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted). Further, counsel's determination of appropriate 
objections and legal arguments fall within the scope of 
professional tactical choices. State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 
1024 (Utah 1987); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), 
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). As such, those decisions are 
generally not reviewable in ineffectiveness claims since: 
Trial tactics lie within the prerogative of 
counsel and may not be dictated by his 
client. Decisions as to what witnesses to 
call, what objections to make, and by and 
large, what defenses to interpose, are 
generally left to the professional judgment 
of counsel. 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d at 806 (quoting Wood, 648 P.2d at 91). 
The underlying merits of all other claims of error by petitioner's 
appellate counsel, have been previously adjudicated on direct 
appeal and found not to be error. Therefore, the district court 
correctly concluded that petitioner had failed to establish any 
deficient performance on the part of counsel (R. 145, Conclusions 
of Law, paragraph 2). 
Further, a reviewing court need not determine whether 
counsel's performance was actually deficient where the petitioner 
has failed to make an initial showing of prejudice to his case. 
For, 
If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack 
of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will 
often be so, that course should be followed. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697. In this regard, the 
district court found that even if it were assumed that appellate 
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counsel had a deficient performance, petitioner had failed to show 
any prejudice therein as required by case law (R. 145, Conclusions 
of Law, paragraph 3). Such a conclusion is fully justified where 
there was overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt at the trial 
level, and no errors found at the appellate level* 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed* 
DATED this day of June, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
(CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS ^X 
Assistant Attorney General 
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